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Abstract
In this paper, we study multibeam satellite secure communication through physical (PHY) layer secu-
rity techniques, i.e., joint power control and beamforming. By first assuming that the Channel State Infor-
mation (CSI) is available and the beamforming weights are fixed, a novel secure satellite system design is
investigated to minimize the transmit power with individual secrecy rate constraints. An iterative algorithm
is proposed to obtain an optimized power allocation strategy. Moreover, sub-optimal beamforming weights
are obtained by completely eliminating the co-channel interference and nulling the eavesdroppers’ signal
simultaneously. In order to obtain jointly optimized power allocation and beamforming strategy in some
practical cases, e.g., with certain estimation errors of the CSI, we further evaluate the impact of the
eavesdropper’s CSI on the secure multibeam satellite system design. The convergence of the iterative
algorithm is proven under justifiable assumptions. The performance is evaluated by taking into account
the impact of the number of antenna elements, number of beams, individual secrecy rate requirement,
and CSI. The proposed novel secure multibeam satellite system design can achieve optimized power
allocation to ensure the minimum individual secrecy rate requirement. The results show that the joint
beamforming scheme is more favorable than fixed beamforming scheme, especially in the cases of a
larger number of satellite antenna elements and higher secrecy rate requirement. Finally, we compare the
results under the current satellite air-interface in DVB-S2 and the results under Gaussian inputs.
Index Terms
Multibeam satellite, beamforming, physical layer security, and power allocation.
2I. INTRODUCTION
The issues of privacy and security in satellite networks have taken on an increasing important role,
especially in military applications. Currently, the secure satellite communication (SATCOM) is realized
only through upper layer protocols (e.g., in [1], [2]). In this paper, we will investigate the multibeam
satellite secure communication through physical (PHY) layer security techniques [3], [4], i.e., joint
power control and beamforming schemes with individual secrecy rate constraints, which can be an
alternative approach for satellite secure communication. Power limitation and co-channel interference are
two challenges for multibeam satellite systems (e.g., in [5]–[8]). Hence, power control and beamforming
could be two approaches for improving the system capacity by adjusting the beam pattern such that
the overall transmitted power is minimized or the Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) is
maximized.
In this paper, we consider the joint power and beamforming with individual secrecy rate constraints.
An iterative algorithm is proposed for updating the transmission power in each iteration, such that a
target secrecy rates are achieved for each beam with minimal power consumption. We first study the
secure SATCOM system design through a power control problem with fixed beamforming. Next, the
beamforming weights are achieved by co-channel interference cancelation and nulling the signal at
the eavesdropper. Moreover, the impact of Channel State Information (CSI) of eavesdropper on secure
SATCOM system design is studied.
In addition to security issues, the efficient resources management is also important for the SATCOM
systems, e.g., bandwidth and power allocation. The authors n [9], [10] investigate the dynamic bandwidth
allocation techniques for satellite systems. For the power control techniques in the satellite scenario, a
power allocation policy is proposed in [5], which suggests to stabilize the system based on the amount
of packets in the queue and the channel state, and a routing decision is made for the maximum total
throughput. In [11], a tradeoff strategy is proposed between different objectives and system optimization.
However, the co-channel interference is not taken into account and a convex optimization problem
is solved. A joint power and carrier allocation problem is discussed in [6], however, only uplink is
considered. In [7], [8], the authors focus on the capacity optimization in multibeam satellite system, and
the duality of in frequency and time domain is studied. The optimization problem of power and carrier
allocation has been addressed in terrestrial networks (e.g. [12], [13]). The authors in [13] propose an
axiomatic-based interference model for SINR balancing problem with individual target SINR per user,
but the conclusions are not directly extrapolable to a satellite scenario. To the best of our knowledge,
3the security issue is not discussed together with power control and beamforming in SATCOM systems.
Beamforming is a sub-optimal strategy to reduce co-channel interference, but it has reduced complexity
compared to Dirty-Paper Coding (DPC). In [14] and [15], transmit beamforming has been used to null the
signal for each co-channel receiver. In [16], the authors studied the Zero-Forcing Beam-Forming (ZFBF) in
the scenario of multiantenna broadcast where the weights are selected such as the multi-user co-channel
interference is cancelled (zero-interference condition). Our work is different from the aforementioned
literatures, since we introduce the physical (PHY) layer security for multibeam satellite systems and
focus on the power control and co-channel interference management jointly.
Previous work (in [5]–[8], [11]–[15]) addresses the problems of power control by SINR balancing and
beamforming separately, and without taking into account the secure communication issues. For security
in SATCOM networks, there exits various works ( [1], [2]). However, most of it only focus on the upper
layer security and realize through protocols, e.g., Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting Proto-
cols (AAA), Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS), IP Security (IPSEC), Point-to-Point Tunnelling Pro-
tocol (PPTP), Internet Keying Exchange (IKE), and Internet Security Association and Key Manage-
ment Protocol (ISAKMP) (in [2]). The PHY layer based security of wireless communication has been
investigated since the contributions in [3], [4]. Recently, the application of PHY layer security in wireless
communication is attracting more attention. E.g., in [17]–[19], the relay cooperating schemes are studied
in order to maximize the achievable secrecy rate or minimize the transmit power. All the relays forward
a weighted version of the decoded/amplified signal to the destination, thus, a maximized secrecy rate or
minimized transmit power can be achieved by optimizing the weighting factor of each relay. The authors
in [20] generalize the secure communication over the fading channels, the power allocation is derived
to minimize the outage probability. Some recent work (in [21]–[28]) has been proposed to improve the
performance, e.g., achievable secrecy rate, by taking advantage of multiple antenna systems. The authors
in [21]–[25] investigate the PHY layer security by using Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems.
In [26], [27], the authors study the achievable rates in Gaussian Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO)
channels with secrecy constraints and conclude that the optimal solution can be achieved by beamforming
in terms of the input covariance matrices. The Single-Input Multiple-Output (SIMO) case is studied
in [28].
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We apply the PHY layer security in SATCOM scenarios, which is novel in the satellite networks.
Since currently the security SATCOM is realized through upper layer protocols.
• We model the system as a MISO wiretap channel, which is different from the aforementioned
4papers in various aspects. Existing MIMO/MISO models focus on the antenna-level for the terrestrial
networks, while we focus on the beam-level for multibeam SATCOM systems. It means that, for a
specific ground terminal, it corresponds to a specific beam on the satellite, the received signals by
this terminal from other beams are considered as co-channel interference.
• The nature of the studied problem is different from the previous works. Existing works focused on
the analysis of the achievable secrecy rate. Our aim is to characterize the secure SATCOM system
through PHY layer design, i.e., power allocation and beamforming design under the individual
secrecy rate constraints.
The main results of this paper can be summarized as:
• We prove that the proposed novel multibeam SATCOM system design can achieve the secure
communication by jointly optimizing the power allocation and beamforming. As expected, in order
to achieve the target secrecy rate, more power will be consumed in the cases of worse legitimate
users’ CSI and better eavesdropper’s CSI.
• Two schemes, power control with fixed beamforming and with joint beamforming, are investigated
and compared. We show that the joint beamforming scheme is more favorable than the fixed
beamforming scheme, especially in the cases of a larger number of antenna elements and higher
individual secrecy rate constraints.
• By comparing the results under the Gaussian inputs with the results under the current air-interface
in DVB-S2, we come to the same conclusions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we model the multibeam downlink system
to obtain a mathematical expression of the secrecy SINR and secrecy rate. The power control problem
with fixed beamforming and iterative algorithm are studied in Section III. In Section IV, we propose and
solve a joint power control and beamforming problem. The beamforming weight vector for each beam is
obtained by joint ZFBF and eavesdropper nulling. The impact of the eavesdropper’s CSI on the system
design is presented in Section V. The performance of the algorithm and numerical results are presented
in Section VI. In Section VII, we draw the conclusions.
We adopt the following notation: Bold uppercase letters denote matrices and bold lowercase letters
denote vectors, (·)∗, (·)T and (·)H denote conjugate, transpose, and conjugate transpose, respectively,
(·)† denotes the Moore Penrose inverse, E{·} denotes the expectation, var{x} denotes the variance of x,
diag{x} denotes a diagonal matrix with the elements of vector x along its main diagonal, 0M×N denotes
an all-zero matrix of size M ×N , ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of the vector x, IM is the identity
5matrix of size M ×M , [X]ij denotes the (i, j) entry of the matrix X, [x]j denotes the jth entry of the
vector x, and log(·) denotes the base-2 logarithm.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the multibeam SATCOM system, we assume a security scenario (e.g., military application, as shown
in Fig. 1), where only a few beams (K) are illuminated by coherently processing (e.g., beamforming) M
antenna elements. The K illuminated beams serve K decentralized legitimate users in the same frequency
band. One eavesdropper, denoted e, is located outside/inside the satellite coverage. Both legitimate users
and eavesdropper are assumed equipped with a single antenna. Therefore, for each of the specific user,
the system can be seen as a MISO wiretap channel. It is different from the MISO model in [26], [27],
because we focus on the beam-level and co-channel interference is taken into account. Our aim is to
realize secure communication between the satellite and the legitimate users by transmit power control
and beamforming. Next, we introduce the different sub-models.
A. Channel Attenuation Amplitude Model
The attenuation due to the atmosphere depends on the frequency, the elevation angle, the altitude of
the station, and the water vapor concentration [29]–[32]. As discussed in [33], the atmosphere attenuation
(e.g., rain attenuation) is negligible at lower frequencies, e.g., less than 10 GHz, but has a strong impact
on the performance at higher frequencies, e.g., Ka-band and above frequencies, which is the frequency
band applied in current SATCOM systems [6]–[8]. Attenuation also depends on the distance that the
electromagnetic wave propagates through space, i.e., path loss. We assume an instantaneous analysis
with fixed channel transfer coefficients. The channel attenuation amplitude matrix A ∈ CK×K is defined
as
A = diag {α1, α2, . . . , αK} , (1)
where αi denotes the channel attenuation factor for legitimate user i where i = 1, 2, . . . ,K. The channel
attenuation factor for the eavesdropper is defined as αe.
B. Antenna Model
We assume an Array Feed Reflector (AFR) antenna system [7], [8], [11], which is able to exploit the
spatial characteristics of the propagation channel. Each beam is synthesized by adding array elements,
hence, we can provide flexible power allocation by controlling the On-Board Processor (OBP). The array
antenna system can achieve large performance gains, depending on the number of antenna elements
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complexity. We suppose that the antenna gain matrix G of size M ×K is given as
G =


g11 g12 . . . g1K
g21 g22 . . . g2K
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
gM1 gM2 . . . gMK


,
where gij is the square root of the gain between the ith beam on-board antenna element and the
jth legitimate user. The antenna gain between M antenna elements and the eavesdropper is ge =
[g1e, g2e, . . . , gMe]
T
.
C. Overall Channel Model
Let H = GA be the overall channel matrix (M ×K) for the legitimate users, and let he = αege be
the overall channel gain vector (M × 1) between M antenna elements and the eavesdropper. The overall
channel between the satellite antenna elements and the legitimate users can be estimated accurately, e.g.,
by introducing a feedback channel. However, in practice, the channel condition between the satellite
antenna elements and the eavesdropper is difficult to be estimated or is even totally unknown. In [34],
the authors studied the possibility to estimate perfectly the CSI of the eavesdropper. However, it is only
applicable in networks combining multicast and unicast transmissions, in which the terminals play dual
roles as legitimate users for some signals and eavesdroppers for others.
In this paper, we do not focus on the CSI estimation, however, we study the system design of power
control and beamforming with given CSI knowledge. Specifically, the two cases of complete eavesdropper
CSI knowledge and imperfect eavesdropper CSI knowledge, are discussed. The first case is a common
assumption in the PHY security literatures [19]–[21]. The attenuation factor can be estimated for the
eavesdropper according to the method proposed in [29]–[32]. For the second case, which is more realistic
in practical, we assume that only imperfect estimates of the eavesdropper’s CSI are available.
D. Received Signal Model
Let sk be the transmitted data symbol to User k. The amplitude of the signal transmitted to each user is
normalized to one, i.e, E{|sk|2} = 1, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. We denote by Pk the allocated power to the
kth beam and, hence, p = [P1, P2, . . . , PK ]T is the power allocation vector to all the beams. All signals are
mapped onto the antenna array elements by the beamforming vectors wk ∈ CM×1, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
7Hence, the beamforming matrix W ∈ CM×K is given by W = [w1,w2, . . . ,wK ]. Without loss of
generality, we assume that ‖wk‖ = 1, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Under this assumption, the transmitted
power for each beam (e.g., beam k) is given by PkE{|sk|2} = Pk.
The block matrix model of the satellite broadcast scenario is shown in Fig. 2. The signals received by
the kth user can be expressed as desired signal and interference as
yk =
√
Pkh
T
kwksk +
∑
j 6=k
√
Pjh
T
kwjsj + nk, (2)
where hk (the kth column of H) is the channel vector (M × 1) between M antenna elements and the
user in the kth ground cell. nk is signal-independent zero-mean complex circular Gaussian noise with
variance σ2k at beam k.
The signal received by the eavesdropper is given as
ye =
√
Pkh
T
ewksk +
∑
j 6=k
√
Pjh
T
ewjsj + ne, (3)
where the term
√
Pkh
T
ewksk is the desired signal if the eavesdropper intend to wiretap the kth user.
hTewj denotes the channel gain between the eavesdropper and the jth antenna element, and ne is a
zero-mean complex circular Gaussian noise at the eavesdropper. We assume that the noise level at the
legitimate user (e.g., user k) is equal to that of at the eavesdropper, i.e., var{nk} = var{ne} = σ2,∀k .
This is a reasonable assumption since the sensitivity of all the terminals is often similar.
E. Signal-to-Interference Plus Noise Ratio
Let Rk , (hkhHk )T , for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, and Re , (hehHe )T . According to the formulation of the
received signal in (2) and (3), we can derive the SINR of the legitimate user k as
Γk =
Pkw
H
k Rkwk
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k
Pjw
H
j Rkwj
, (4)
and the SINR of the eavesdropper, which intend to wiretap the signal transmitted to user k as
Γek =
Pkw
H
k Rewk
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k
Pjw
H
j Rewj
. (5)
F. Secrecy Rate Model
As we have indicated in the introduction, there have been several precedents that investigate the PHY
layer security of the MIMO wiretap channel, but they only focus on the terrestrial networks. Certainly,
8these results also cover the special case of the MISO channel. For the case of one eavesdropper, an
achievable secrecy rate for a specific user (e.g., for the kth user) is given as [19, Eq. (10)]
Rks = max{Rk −Rek}, (6)
where the achievable of the maximum was shown in [25], [27] with Gaussian inputs, Rk is the achievable
rate of the link between the satellite and the kth user, and Rek is the achievable rate of the link between
the satellite and the eavesdropper. Note that the secrecy rate in (6) is achievable unless the maximum
value is negative, in which case, the achieved secrecy rate is zero [4]. In this paper, we focus on the
practical scenario in which the secrecy rate is positive.
In [26], [27], the authors discuss how to maximize the difference by adaptively adjust the power
allocation. Conversely, we restrict ourselves to the difference between Rk and Rek. Our aim is to
characterize the best power allocation scheme over multibeam SATCOM systems subject to the individual
secrecy rate constraints, i.e. the difference Rk −Rek for each user.
By assuming Gaussian inputs, the difference between Rk and Rek can be written as
Rk −Rek = log (1 + Γk)− log (1 + Γek) = log 1 + Γk
1 + Γek
= log
(
1 +
Γk − Γek
1 + Γek
)
= log
(
1 + Γks
)
, (7)
where Γks is defined as the secrecy SINR, which is the updated SINR after introducing the eavesdropping,
and it is given by
Γks ,
Γk − Γek
1 + Γek
. (8)
From (4) and (5), we notice that Γks is a function of two parameters, i.e., the beamforming matrix
W and the power vector p. In the next sections, we will discuss how to minimize the overall power
consumption (sum of the elements inside p) under the SINR constraint per beam by taking into account
both fixed and optimized beamforming matrix. From (7), we can see that the optimization problem with
a secrecy SINR constraint is equivalent to the secrecy rate constraint. If we consider that the secrecy rate
required by the kth user is Rˆks , the secrecy SINR requirement can be derived as γk = 2Rˆ
k
s −1. Therefore,
in the following section, we focus on the power control problem with a secrecy SINR constraint per user.
III. POWER CONTROL PROBLEM WITH FIXED BEAMFORMING
In this section, we assume that the beamforming matrix W˜ = [w˜1, w˜2, . . . , w˜K ] is optimized, with
‖w˜k‖ = 1, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. We focus on the secure SATCOM system design through power
allocation with individual SINR constraints.
9A more general solution based on [35] is proposed to solve the power control problem. By doing
the multibeam satellite power control, the overall transmit power of each beam is optimized, so that the
received secrecy rate of each user satisfies Rks ≥ Rˆks , for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, i.e., the secrecy SINR has
Γks ≥ γk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, (where γk is the predefined targeted SINR threshold in order to realize the
required secrecy rate), while the overall transmitted power used by all beams is minimized. Hence, the
power control problem can be defined as
min
p
∑
k
Pk, (9)
subject to Γks(W˜,p) ≥ γk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
The minimum power is achieved when the SINR is equal to the target value, i.e., Γks = γk for
k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. The problem in (9) is a Nondeterministic Polynomial (NP) hard problem [36, Chapter 5,
pp. 109]. Therefore, an iteration algorithm is proposed to find a solution. Many iteration algorithms (e.g.,
in [37]–[39]) have been proposed in order to decrease the complexity. However, the algorithm in this
paper is different, since the eavesdropper is present.
We first construct the complete iteration expression as I(pn), which is a power-update equation. pn =
[Pn1 , P
n
2 , . . . , P
n
K ]
T is the power vector for all the K beams at the nth iteration step. Then, for each beam
(e.g., beam k), the interference function Ik(p) can be derived. The power allocated to each beam can be
iteratively updated until converge with the individual secrecy SINR constraints. The algorithm steps at
the (n+ 1)th iteration are as follows:
Iteration Algorithm:
pn+1 = I(pn) (10)
The power-update for the kth beam at the (n+ 1)th iteration is
Pn+1k =
γk
µnk − (1 + γk)µnek
, Ik(p
n), (11)
where µnk and µnek are defined as
µnk =
Γnk
Pnk
=
Θkk
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k
Pnj Θkj
, (12)
and
µnek =
Γnek
Pnk
=
Θek
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k
Pnj Θej
, (13)
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respectively, where Γnk and Γnek are the updated SINR of the legitimate user k and the eavesdropper at
the nth iteration step, Θkk = w˜Hk Rkw˜k, Θkj = w˜Hj Rkw˜j , Θek = w˜Hk Rew˜k, and Θej = w˜Hj Rew˜j .
The computation of Θkk, Θkj , Θek, and Θej dominates the computational complexity of the algorithm.
Since w˜k is a M × 1 vector, Rk and Re are M ×M matrices, thus, the expressions in (12) and (13)
require a computational complexity of O(M4) for updating the allocated power per user. Thus, the
computational complexity is quite high for the cases of large number of beams. However, in this paper,
we assume a security scenario (e.g., military application), where only a few beams are implemented,
hence, the number of antenna element M is quite low (e.g., max. 20 as we assumed), and the proposed
algorithm computational complexity is reasonable. In addition, since the satellite channel is relatively
stable, the computations needed are less frequently. Moreover, as we have noted in the antenna model
section, although the array antenna system can achieve large performance gains with large number of
antenna elements M , these gains come at the cost of the increased hardware complexity and computational
complexity.
In [35], [40], the authors have proved that if the interference function is standard, the algorithm will
achieve the optimal solution if there exists at least one feasible solution. The interference function Ik(p)
is standard if for all p ≥ 0 the following three properties are satisfied [35], [40]:
• Positivity: Ik(p) > 0.
• Monotonicity: If p ≥ p′, then Ik(p) ≥ Ik(p′) or Ik(p) ≤ Ik(p′).1
• Scalability: For all ρ > 1, ρIk(p) > Ik(ρp).
For the proposed interference function (11), we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1: The interference function Ik(pn) in (11) is a standard function under the following three
conditions:
• Condition 1: bk > ck.
• Condition 2: bkh˜k > ckh˜e, bkh˜e > ckh˜k, and bkh˜kh˜Tk > ckh˜eh˜Te , bkh˜eh˜Te > ckh˜kh˜Tk , ∀k.2
• Condition 3:
√
bk[h˜k]jh˜e >
√
ck[h˜e]jh˜k, ∀k, j 6= k.
Where bk = Θkk, ck = (1+ γk)Θek, and h˜k denotes the channel gain vector (K × 1) of the interference
1The inequality between two vectors, e.g., x ≥ y, means that xi ≥ yi for i = 1, . . . ,K, where x = [x1, x2, . . . , xK ],
y = [y1, y2, . . . , yK ].
2The inequality between two matrices, e.g., X ≥ Y, means that [X]ij > [Y]ij , ∀i, j.
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contribution to the desired user, defined as
[h˜k]j =


Θkj, if j 6= k,
0, otherwise.
h˜e denotes the channel gain vector (K × 1) of the interference contribution to the eavesdropper, defined
as
[h˜e]j =


Θej, if j 6= k,
0, otherwise.
The proof Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A.
In a practical scenario, the overall channel gain of the link “satellite - desired user” is much larger
than that of the link “satellite - co-channel users”, i.e., Θkk ≫ Θkj for ∀j 6= k, the overall channel
gain of the link “satellite - desired user” is larger than that of the link “satellite - eavesdropper”, i.e.,
Θkk ≫ Θej for ∀j. The magnitudes of Θkj and Θej are roughly equal. Therefore, with the lower
secrecy SINR request γk, the above three conditions are indeed satisfied. In the case of very high SINR
requirement, we can introduce optimization of the satellite antenna beamformer in order to decrease or
eliminate the co-channel interference and the eavesdropper interference, and thereby the above conditions
can still be satisfied.
IV. JOINT POWER CONTROL AND BEAMFORMING
The level of co-channel interference and wiretapped signal for each user depend both on the gain
between interfering transmitters and user, as well as on the level of transmitter powers, i.e., the optimal
beamforming vector may vary for different power allocation policy. Hence, in this section, we first obtain
a sub-optimal beamforming weight vector by completely eliminating the co-channel interference and
nulling the eavesdroppers’ signal simultaneously. Then, the power solution can be optimized when the
secrecy rate is equal to the target value.
In the joint power control and beamforming problem, the objective is to find the optimal weight
matrix W and power allocation vector p such that the secrecy SINR threshold is achieved by all the
users, while minimize the transmission power. The problem can be formulated as
min
W,p
∑
k
Pk, (14)
subject to Γks(W,p) ≥ γk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
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This problem can be solved in two steps: Firstly, we obtain the beamforming weight matrix W by
joint ZFBF and eavesdropper signal nulling, in which all the co-channel signal and eavesdropper signal
are completely eliminated. Secondly, the optimized power allocation solution can be obtained by solving
Γks = γk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, under the beamforming weights obtained in the first step.
A. Joint Zero-Forcing Beamforming and Eavesdropper Nulling
In order to completely eliminate the co-channel interference and null the signals at the eavesdropper, we
assume that M > K. Note that in the case of M ≤ K, we cannot completely eliminate the interference
from the co-channel users and nulling the signals at the eavesdropper; appropriate system design for the
case of M ≤ K is an interesting future research direction.
By ZFBF (in [41], [42]), the weights are selected such as the co-channel interference is canceled (zero-
interference condition), i.e., for the desired user k, hTkwj = 0 for j 6= k. Similarly, the eavesdropping
interference can also be completely nulled by beamforming (e.g., in [17]–[19]), i.e., for the desired user
k, hTewk = 0 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
Hence, the secrecy SINR can be reformulated from (8) as
Γks(W,p) =
Pkw
H
k Rkwk
σ2
=
Pk|hTkwk|2
σ2
. (15)
Therefore, in order to minimize the transmitted power Pk, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, under the secrecy
SINR constraints γk, we have to maximize the gain between the satellite antenna and the kth user, i.e.,
max |hTkwk|2, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. It means that we have to solve K maximize problems jointly. The
kth optimization problem can be formulated as
max
wk
|hTkwk|2, (16)
subject to


hTkwj = 0, for j 6= k,
hTewk = 0,
wHk wk = 1.
Note that the overall optimization problem is composed of K optimization problems as expressed in
(16) (for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K). In an equivalent way, we re-formulate the K jointly maximize problems as K
independent maximization problem, e.g., the problem to solve the kth beamforming weight vector can
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be formulated as
max
wk
|hTkwk|2, (17)
subject to


HTekwk = 0K×1,
wHk wk = 1,
where Hek is defined as
[Hek]ij ,


[H]ij , if j 6= k,
[he]i, if j = k.
(18)
The solution of the beamforming problem in (17) is given by [19, Eq. (23)] as
wk =
(IM − Fe)h∗k
‖ (IM − Fe)h∗k‖
, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, (19)
where
Fe = (Hek)
†Hek,
where (Hek)† = (Hek)H
(
Hek(Hek)
H
)−1
is the Moore Penrose inverse of Hek (in [43]).
As discussed in Section III, the minimum power is achieved when the SINR is equal to the target
value, i.e., Γks = γk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Therefore, we can obtain the solution from (15) as
Pk =
γkσ
2
|hTkwk|2
, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, (20)
where wk is the solution of the beamforming weight vector for the kth beam.
V. IMPACT ON CSI OF EAVESDROPPER
The channels between the satellite and the desired users can be estimated accurately, since they are
legitimate channels. However, in practice, the channels between the satellite and the eavesdropper can
only be estimated, and the estimation contains errors. In the following two subsections, we will investigate
the system design with unknown or imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper.
A. Unknown Eavesdropper CSI
In this case, we assume that the entries of he are random variables, and R̂e = E
{
(hˆehˆ
H
e )
T
}
is known
a priori. Therefore, in order to minimize the power consumption subject to given target secrecy SINR,
we can use a sub-optimal way to cancel the co-channel interference, i.e., ZFBF.
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We can formulate the kth beamforming weight vector optimization problem as
max
wk
|hTkwk|2, (21)
subject to


hTkwj = 0, for j 6= k,
wHk wk = 1.
This problem is similar to the problem formulated in (16), thus, we obtain the solution as
wk =
(IM − F)h∗k
‖ (IM − F)h∗k‖
, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, (22)
where
F = (Hk)
†Hk,
where (Hk)† = (Hk)H
(
Hk(Hk)
H
)−1
, and Hk is the co-channel contribution matrix M × (K − 1)
defined as
Hk , [h1, . . . ,hk−1,hk+1, . . . ,hK ], (23)
where hj (j 6= k) is the jth column of the channel matrix H.
After obtain the beamforming vector for each beam, the power allocation solution can also be obtained
by the iteration algorithm in (11), i.e.,
Pn+1k =
γk
µnk − (1 + γk)µnek
, (24)
where µnk and µnek are re-defined in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: The interference function in (24) is a standard function under the condition: bk > ck,
where bk = wHk Rkwk, ck = (1 + γk)wHk R̂ewk. µnk and µnek are defined as
µnk =
wHk Rkwk
σ2
, (25)
and
µnek =
wHk R̂ewk∑
j 6=k
Pnj w
H
j R̂ewj + σ
2
, (26)
respectively.
See Appendix B for the proof of Theorem 2.
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B. Imperfect Eavesdropper CSI
The perfect channel gain he ∈ CM×1 between the satellite antenna elements and eavesdropper is
modeled as
he = hˆe +∆e, (27)
where hˆe ∈ CM×1 is the imperfect eavesdropper channel estimation, and ∆e ∈ CM×1 corresponds to the
channel estimation error. We assume that the entries of ∆e are random variables, which is independent
of hˆe, and R∆e , E
{
(∆e∆
H
e )
T
}
is known a priori. Thus,
Re = E
{
(heh
H
e )
T
}
= R̂e +R∆e , (28)
where R̂e = (hˆehˆHe )T .
By joint ZFBF and nulling the eavesdropper’s signal, we obtain the beamforming vector, e.g., for the
kth beam, as expressed in function (19). However, Hek is replaced with Ĥek, which is defined as
[Ĥek]ij =


[H]ij , if j 6= k,
[hˆe]i, if j = k.
(29)
We can solve the power control problem with the iteration algorithm in function (24), then µnek is
re-defined as
µnek =
wHk R∆ewk∑
j 6=k
Pnj w
H
j R∆ewj + σ
2
. (30)
As expressed in Theorem 2, the interference function in (24) is standard with µnk and µnek given in
(25) and (30), respectively.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed system designs, we perform Monte Carlo
simulations consisting of 1000 independent trials to obtain the average results. We define the SATCOM
system payload parameters the same as in [7] and assume that the noise power σ2 is -10 dBm. For
simplicity, the secrecy SINR request for all the beams is assumed to be equal, i.e., γk = γ0 for
k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. The channel for each link is modeled as a product of an attenuation factor and a random
phase. For example, the channel between the legitimate user k and the antenna element m is defined
as hmk = αke
jς
, and the channel between the antenna elements and the eavesdropper is hem = αeejς ,
where ς is a random phase uniformly distributed within [0, 2pi), and it is independent of m and k.
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We first fix the number of antenna elements to M = 8, the number of beams to K = 5, the channel
attenuation factor αk = αe = 0.8 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K to investigate the convergence of the iteration
algorithm. In Fig. 3, the curves show the total power consumption at each iteration step for different
target secrecy SINR. The results show that the algorithm converge. Notice from the figure that the black
curve with higher target SINR (γ0 = 8 dB) converges slower than that of the red curve with lower target
SINR (γ0 = 6 dB), since more power is needed to achieve higher SINR requirements.
Fig. 4 illustrates satellite transmit power versus the number of antenna elements M . The fixed beam-
forming vector (e.g., for beam k) is assumed as ‖w˜k‖ = 1. The curves show that the transmitted
power in the scheme of fixed beamforming is almost independent of the number of antenna elements,
and the transmitted power in the scheme of joint beamforming decreases as the number of antenna
elements increases. From the optimization point of view, the satellite transmitted power can be saved by
increasing the number of antenna elements. However, from the satellite payload designers’ point of view,
the complexity and the weight of the satellite will increase as the number of antenna elements increases.
Therefore, the optimal number of antenna elements should be balanced by taking into account all these
views.
In Fig. 5, we evaluate the transmitted power according to different number of beams on the satellite.
We fix the number of antenna elements at M = 15 and increase the number of beams K from 2 to 12.
All other parameters are the same in Fig. 4. As expected, the power consumption increases as the number
of beams and secrecy request increase for both schemes. Especially, the transmitted power increases very
quickly in the case of a large number of beams. In Fig. 6, we simulate the power allocation according
to the channel attenuation amplitude of the eavesdropper, the horizontal axis in the figure indicates the
channel attenuation amplitude degradation in dB, e.g., 0 dB means the clear sky scenario. From the figure,
we see that the joint beamforming scheme is almost independent of the eavesdropper’s channel condition,
which means that the satellite can adapt the channel degradation by optimizing the beamformer design.
For the fixed beamforming scheme, the transmitted power will decrease as the eavesdropper’s channel
condition deteriorates.
The performance of the transmit power as a function of the secrecy SINR request is shown in Fig. 7.
For simplicity, we assume that the channel attenuation amplitudes for all the users are the same, and the
channel attenuation amplitude of the eavesdropper is assumed as αe = 1, clear sky. All other parameters
are the same as previous figures. For both fixed beamforming and joint beamforming schemes, the
curves in Fig. 7 show that, as the channel condition deteriorates, more power will be consumed in order
to compensate the signal attenuation. We can also conclude from this figure that the joint beamforming
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scheme is more favorable than fixed beamforming scheme in the case of a higher secrecy SINR request,
since the power allocation is more sensitive to the higher secrecy SINR request (e.g., when γ0 > 6 dB).
The performance of a single legitimate user (e.g., User 1) is evaluated in Fig. 8. We assume that the
channel attenuation amplitude of User 1 (α1) is changed from 1 (i.e., clear sky) to 0.2, and all other
parameters are the same in Fig. 3. As expected, the power allocated to Beam 1 will increase as the
channel condition of User 1 deteriorates, especially in the case of a bad channel condition. In Fig. 9, we
compare the power allocation with and without the available of the eavesdropper’s CSI. The value of the
parameters is the same in Fig. 7. Under the given total power limitation (e.g., 100 Watts), the achieved
secrecy SINR per user with known eavesdropper’s CSI performs about 2 dB better than the case of no
CSI available. In addition, this gap increases as the available total power increases.
In Fig. 10, we compare the results with Gaussian inputs and with the current air-interface in DVB-S2.
The value of the parameters is assumed to be the same as in Fig. 7. For the case of the joint beamforming
scheme, the sum of power consumption increases as the spectral efficiency requirement increases for both
Gaussian inputs and DVB-S2 cases. The power consumption of the DVB-S2 case is always larger than
the Gaussian inputs case, and the gap between them tends to decrease as the spectral efficiency increases.
Table I shows the maximum number of users for different system designs. We assume that Ptot =
10Watt, γ0 = 6dB, and M = 20. The first row indicates the maximum capacity of the system design
for a fixed power allocation and a fixed beamforming system design, which is the baseline reference
system design. We can notice that the capacity of the system design only with the flexibility in power
allocation is around two times better than the reference one, and the capacity of the joint power control
and beamforming system design is five times better than the reference one. In addition, the table also
shows that the capacity of the joint power control and beamforming system design is not sensitive to the
eavesdropper’s channel condition.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
By PHY layer techniques, we realize secure communication of multibeam SATCOM systems while
minimizing the overall transmitted power. The power control problems is developed in different cases
and an iterative algorithm is proposed to solve the problems. Specifically, we first assume that the
beamforming weights are fixed, and propose a novel secure SATCOM system design that minimizes the
satellite transmit power with individual secrecy rate constraints. A joint power control and beamforming
problem is investigated to realize secure communication. The beamforming weight vector is solved by
completely eliminating the co-channel interference and nulling the eavesdroppers’ signal simultaneously.
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Furthermore, the impact of channel condition of eavesdropper on the secure system design is studied.
After the numerical simulation, we conclude that the proposed multibeam SATCOM system design can
realize the secure communication by joint power control and beamforming. In order to achieve the target
individual secrecy rate per user, more power will be consumed in the cases of worse legitimate users’
CSI and better eavesdropper’s CSI. The results also show that the joint power and beamforming scheme
is more favorable than the fixed beamforming scheme in the cases of larger number of antenna elements
and higher secrecy SINR request. Under a given overall power limitation (e.g., 100 Watts), the maximum
secrecy SINR achieved per user with known eavesdropper’s CSI preforms 2 dB better than the case
without CSI available. By comparing the results with Gaussian inputs and with the current air-interface
in DVB-S2, we come to the same conclusions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Proof of Positivity
The interference function Ik(p) in (11) can be rewritten as
Ik(p) =
ak
bk
σ2+pT h˜k
− ck
σ2+pT h˜e
=
ak
f(p)
, (31)
where bk and ck are defined in Section III, and ak = γk > 0. f(p) is defined as
f(p) =
bk
σ2 + pT h˜k
− ck
σ2 + pT h˜e
=
σ2 (bk − ck) +
(
bkp
T h˜e − ckpT h˜k
)
(
σ2 + pT h˜e
)(
σ2 + pT h˜k
) . (32)
Under the assumed conditions, we obtain bk−ck > 0 and bkpT h˜e−ckpT h˜k > 0. Therefore, f(p) > 0,
and the positivity is proved.
B. Proof of Monotonicity
A preference operator or equivalent relation “⇔” is defined for indicating that two expressions are
equivalent. E.g., “Ik(p) monotonically increasing” ⇔ “f(p) monotonically decreasing”, where f(p) is
defined in (32).
Let ϕ(p) be defined as ϕ(p) = ∂f(p)
∂p
and, hence, “f(p) monotonically decreasing” ⇔ “ϕ(p) <
0, if p > 0”. ϕ(p) can be formulated as
ϕ(p) =
∂f(p)
∂p
=
ckh˜e(
σ2 + pT h˜e
)2 − bkh˜k(
σ2 + pT h˜k
)2 = ψ(p)(
σ2 + pT h˜k
)2(
σ2 + pT h˜e
)2 , (33)
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where
ψ(p) = ckh˜e
(
σ2 + pT h˜k
)2 − bkh˜k(σ2 + pT h˜e)2. (34)
Thus, “ϕ(p) < 0, if p > 0” ⇔ “ψ(p) < 0, if p > 0”. For the jth element of ψ(p), i.e., ψj(p), it
can be presented as
ψj(p) = 2ck[h˜e]j
(
σ2 + pT h˜k
)2 − 2bk[h˜k]j(σ2 + pT h˜e)2. (35)
Thus, in order to prove ψ(p) < 0, it is equivalent to prove√
ck[h˜e]j
(
σ2 + pT h˜k
)
<
√
bk[h˜k]j
(
σ2 + pT h˜e
)
. (36)
or, (√
ck[h˜e]j −
√
bk[h˜k]j
)
σ2 + pT
(√
ck[h˜e]jh˜k −
√
bk[h˜k]jh˜e
)
< 0. (37)
Under the Conditions 2 and 3, we find that
√
ck[h˜e]j−
√
bk[h˜k]j < 0 and
√
ck[h˜e]jh˜k−
√
bk[h˜k]jh˜e <
0, respectively. Therefore, the inequality in (37) is satisfied and the monotonicity is shown.
C. Proof of Scalability
The scalability condition can be rewritten as (if ρ > 1)
ρak
bk
σ2+pT h˜k
− ck
σ2+pT h˜e
>
ρak
ρbk
σ2+ρpT h˜k
− ρck
σ2+ρpT h˜e
, (38)
since Ik(p) ≥ 0, the condition in (38) is equivalent to
bk
σ2 + pT h˜k
− ck
σ2 + pT h˜e
<
ρbk
σ2 + ρpT h˜k
− ρck
σ2 + ρpT h˜e
. (39)
Inequality (39) is equivalent to
∆
(σ2 + pT h˜k)(σ2 + pT h˜e)(σ2 + ρpT h˜k)(σ2 + ρpT h˜e)
< 0, (40)
where ∆ is given by
∆ =σ6 (1− ρ) (bk − ck) + σ4
(
1− ρ2
) (
bkp
T h˜e − ckpT h˜k
)
+ σ2ρ (1− ρ)
[
bk(p
T h˜e)
2 − ck(pT h˜k)2
]
,
(41)
where the condition in (40) ⇔ “∆ < 0”. bk > ck is satisfied under the Condition 1, and bkpT h˜e >
ckp
T h˜k, and bk(pT h˜e)2 > ck(pT h˜k)2 are satisfied under the Condition 2. Since ρ > 1, ∆ in (41) is
proved that ∆ < 0. Therefore, the scalability is also proved.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
As we proved in Appendix A, by replacing h˜k and h˜e with h˜k = 0, and
[h˜e]j =


wHj R̂ewj, if j 6= k,
0, otherwise,
(42)
respectively, we will prove the positivity, monotonicity and scalability in the following.
A. Proof of Positivity
f(p) in (32) can be re-formulated as
f(p) =
bk
σ2
− ck
σ2 + pT h˜e
=
σ2 (bk − ck) + bkpT h˜e
σ2
(
σ2 + pT h˜e
) . (43)
Since bk ≥ ck, it follows that f(p) > 0, the positivity of Ik(p) is proved.
B. Proof of Monotonicity
ϕ(p) in (33) can be re-formulated with h˜k = 0 as
ϕ(p) =
∂f(p)
∂p
=
ckh˜e(
σ2 + pT h˜e
)2 > 0. (44)
Therefore, f(p) increase monotonically with p, the monotonicity of Ik(p) is proved.
C. Proof of Scalability
We can re-formulate ∆ in (41) as (let h˜k = 0)
∆ =σ6 (1− ρ) (bk − ck) + σ4
(
1− ρ2
)
bkp
T h˜e + σ
2ρ (1− ρ) bk(pT h˜e)2. (45)
Since ρ > 1 and bk > ck , ∆ in (45) is shown that ∆ < 0. Therefore, the scalability is also proved.
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Fig. 6. Total power consumption versus the channel attenuation amplitude to the eavesdropper with M = 8, K = 5, and
αk = 0.8 for k = 1, 2, . . . , 5.
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Fig. 7. Total transmitted power versus the target secrecy SINR with M = 8, K = 5, and αe = 1.
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Fig. 8. Transmitted power for a specific beam (e.g., Beam 1) versus the channel condition with M = 8, K = 5, and
αk = αe = 0.8 for k = 2, 3, 4, and 5.
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Fig. 9. Power allocation with or without the available the eavesdropper CSI with M = 8, K = 5 and αe = 1.
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Fig. 10. Total transmitted power comparison for the DVB-S2 air-interface and Gaussian inputs with M = 8, K = 5, and
αe = 1.
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TABLE I
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF USERS (PTOT = 10 WATT, γ0 = 6dB , M = 20)
System setup Maximum number of users
Fixed power, fixed beamforming 4
αk = αe = 1
Power control, fixed beamforming 9
αk = αe = 1
Power control, fixed beamforming 13
αk = 1, αe = 0.5
Joint power control and beamforming 20
αk = αe = 1
Joint power control and beamforming 21
αk = 1, αe = 0.5
